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          Abstract 
This paper presents the preliminary progress of an industry driven programme to improve 
the data monitoring of safety/hazard near miss reporting from front line staff of a branch 
of a multinational energy supply company in Ireland. The paper discusses the main 
factors that emerged as possible causes for underreporting and the course of action 
selected for addressing them. The initiative, which is only in operation for 4 months has 
already led to an increase in reporting of “near misses” by a factor of nine. Furthermore, 
the level and detail of the reports is far greater than had previously being received.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is recognised as Best Practice that collating and monitoring of data on safety incidents or reported 
near misses would lead to better learning and indeed the avoidance of accidents in the future.  (Jones 
et al 1999). Various studies have showed the relationship between near miss incidents and actual 
accidents pointing out that reducing the number of near misses that occur will very likely reduce the 
likelihood of full accidents, which in turn would lead to less severe human, economic and 
environmental impact., (Bird & Germain, 1966; Heinrich, 1980; Tye, 1976). 
Within this paper, the experience of the safety advisor within a division of a larger multinational 
energy supply company was able to identify from report statistics supplied by the Head Health 
and Safety Office that near miss data from field staff in his division as a whole was not being 
reported. This data has the potential to identify latent hazards in plant, equipment, procedures 
and in design of high voltage (HV) equipment that may otherwise go unnoticed. 
The division in question is the Asset Management Service, AMS, within the company, which is 
responsible for providing a full range of commissioning services on new and maintained HV 
plant & equipment. AMS also ensures the correct operation of protection schemes on the 
Transmission systems.  
During 2009 this section of the company only had only reported 2 near misses for events of 
trivial importance related to offices and nothing referring to site operations. The 80 staff in the 
division spend the majority of their time in the field on site works. The fact that there was no 
reporting from the field was of concern to the senior management team in AMS.  
 
 
The Issue of Underreporting  
 
Various studies on organizational-level under-reporting linked the issue to multiple factors.  
Typical issues would be the general safety climate, the specific industrial, sector, the company 
size and the perceived lack of management engagement (Leigh et al., 2004; Oleinick et al., 
1995, Daniels and Marlow, 2005, Clarke, 1998, Probst et al., 2008; Zohar, 2003) at individual-
level under-reporting has been ascribed to factors such as fear of reprisals, loss of benefits or a 
fatalistic attitude that  injuries are a fact of life in certain lines of work (Webb et al., 
1989;Pransky et al., 1999; Sinclair and Tetrick, 2004, (Pransky et al., 1999). 
 
From a previous study performed in Ireland in the construction sector (McDonald N and 
Hrymak V. 2002) it appears also that the presence of a safety representative on site shows a 
very strong relationship with hazards reporting and safety compliance. The report of the study 
states that “safety representatives influence safety compliance not only through their influence 
on the response to audits and hazards but also through other means. Thus they encourage the 
reporting of hazards and help ensure that these reports lead to better safety compliance on site. 
Their presence also makes it significantly less likely that workers will continue to work in 
hazardous situations”. 
 
In the context of the present study the positive effects of the safety representative on site were 
reinforced thanks to the presence of the specific organizational role played by Safety Advisor 
within the specific division.  
The Safety Advisor in this case was an interface between the central Health and Safety 
Department and Asset Management Services and He was tasked to take care of the division 
specific safety issues involved in the day to day operations. 
 
The Safety Advisor was able to work on site with the staff and perform informal interviews in 
order to try and identify the main issues  for this lack of reporting. Through this process three 
factors emerged as possible causes for underreporting:  
1. The current definition of “near miss reporting ” and indeed the actual  safety training 
received by the staff  were confusing. 
2. The actual reporting framework was received as extra paper work to be sent to the 
immediate supervisor in a very fomal process.  
3. Poor feedback on reported problems.  
 
Overall the “near misses” reporting process was seen as something the staff was told to do 
rather than something they should be doing for their own benefit. As a result it was perceived as 
“an extra task not a value”. 
 
A simple plan for action  
 
In identifying the best course of action to take to try and improve reporting of  the following 
elements were taken into account: 
A. A dedicated safety advisor for the Asset Management section to bridege the gap 
between the Safety Management System and day to day operations. 
B. a different definition of near misses that would highlight the relevance in respect to the 
everyday operations and a proper communication of it to the workers 
C. A reporting form more closely related to forms currently part of day to day usage 
D. A feedback mechanism to ensure the benefits of reporting in terms of follow up would 
reach the front line staff in charge of reporting. 
 
The Role of the Safety Advisor 
As already pointed out the operational safety advisor for the Asset Management Services 
(AMS) division of the company is a specific recognised organizational role established to take 
proper action for the safety issues of the division of a specific technical nature rather than the 
management of occupational health on site, which was still dealt by the Central Health and 
Safety Office. The Safety Advisor in fact had to also develop personal technical competencies 
for AMS in parallel with the safety role.; which in turn enable him/her to work side by side with 
the rest of the technical staff of the division. 
The availability of a safety advisor close at hand similar to a safety representative but with the 
managerial role to enforce and follow up on issues raised on the field was highlighted as a 
strong guarantee towards the achievement of a better promotion of a reporting culture and a 
closer feedback to the front line staff, in line with the findings of the HSA research report for 
the construction sector (McDonald and Hrymak 2002). 
 
 
Near Misses, definitions and communications 
The definition of near misses previously provided by the Central Health And Safety Office of 
the company stated that: 
‘A near miss is an incident where personal injury was narrowly avoided or where damage to 
property-only occurred. A good catch is an unsafe condition/act, which if left unaddressed could 
result in an injury. Such incidents may be early warning signs of hazards that could eventually 
result in serious consequences. By reporting such incidents you will help make the workplace 
safer for yourself, your colleagues and visitors. Remember, what is a near miss today could 
result in an accident tomorrow.’ 
 
The staff understanding of the above definition also reinforced by the type of information 
provided by newsletters and the periodic training promoted by the Central office was that a near 
miss belonged only to realm of occupational health on site and did not apply to specific 
technical issues related to operations. The link between the day to day anomalies in the field and 
the ability to make work practices more efficient, of a higher quality and safer was not being 
recognised. 
The Safety Advisor was able to introduce among his fellow workers an alternative definition 
and to promulgate it through a specific meeting. 
‘An opportunity to improve safety, health, environmental and quality practice based on a 
condition, an incident or an observation with minor outcomes but with the potential for more 
serious consequence. ‘ 
 
The workers were made aware that the consequences proposed in the definition can include but 
were not limited to the following: 
- Property damage 
- Damage to the environment 
- Business interruption 
- Deviations for example from the work instruction or procedure  
- Potential or actual injury to staff 
 
The definition above was presented and discussed with the personnel by the safety Advisor in 
the following ways: 
i. Organizing a meeting with the engineering manager where it was agreed to produce a 
document outlining the benefits of an integrated approach to the management of quality, 
safety, health and environmental issues. 
ii. Providing a presentation during a periodic team briefing meeting in the AMS section 
where the alternative definition was discussed and amended 
iii. Sending a communication through email to all AMS staff  
iv. Reiterating on the presentation regarding the near miss management approach at 
Specialist Team  meeting and subsequent team meetings attended 
v. Promoting the idea also informally on site  
 
The initial feedback was that the new definition was accepted as a better fit to the working 
environment in AMS since it gave the opportunity to report or capture technical deviations or 
observations that commissioning and maintenance staff can encounter in their daily tasks. 
 
 
A new reporting framework: making better use of what is already there 
The new reporting framework for the initiative was introduced as an informal process. The 
future direction of it to be embedded in the commissioning checklists that are already used as 
part of the sign off for the operators working on site. 
 
Currently commissioning based reporting has two elements. The first is the on-site Snag List 
Form(see figure 1) and the other is the Project Follow-Up Reporting form. The snag list is to be 
given to the person on site responsible for correcting it and then entered into a so called 
“SharePoint folder” where the design team can monitor it and make the any design changes. 
 
The Project Follow-Up Report form is given to the people identified as responsible for solving 
the issues and also sent electronically to the designer and manager of substation design. This 
form should also be copied to the SharePoint folder where the actions can be monitored. The 
deviations recorded on the snag list However or the follow up report forms are not currently 
considered as possible elements of the miss reports statistics at central level. 
 
 
Figure 1: company existing Snag list for commissioning operations 
 
Further a Database has been introduced to collect and monitor the commissioning checklist as 
records of the operations completed. 
The database has a function that provides report templates for commissioning  and “condition 
based assessment” of assets and records the results. These templates are designed by AMS staff. 
The templates also provide the option of recording deviations in an ‘additional comments’ field 
and to import or export documents/files/jpeg/PDF. Reports can also be generated for any 
specific asset. 
The safety advisor prompted the workers to start using that part of the current reporting forms 
for forwarding information on near misses via mail to him and whenever possible attach 
pictures of the possible event being reported. Figure 2 reports the example of a picture attached 
to one of the reports (“Failure of 110 kV cable sealing end”). 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of a picture taken by one of the worker and sent as part of a near miss report 
on the failure of 110 kV cable sealing end 
 
The advantage of using existing tools for reporting is that the use of ad hoc extra forms may fail 
to provide a real-time picture of routine operations supporting performance management and 
predictive risk management. Furthermore the use of many discrete tools implies that much 
valuable data gathered about the operation are stored and analyzed in different formats and by 
different and often disjointed departments. This makes it difficult to obtain an integrated risk 
registry (Leva et al 2010), while the effort of integrating existing data collection tools can be a 
much more practical way to operate the data monitoring reducing the paperwork. 
 
Another issue existing with the previous reporting system is the fact that the health and safety 
office at central level presents a classifications system for near misses with categories that are 
fairly generic and therefore are not able to really direct possible improvements and follow up 
initiative on specific technical areas in a meaningful way. An example of this is observable from 
figure 3 reporting the headings under which near misses are currently categorized. It is clear that 
a category named “electrical” is far too generic to be able to provide any clear indication for a 
division in charge of commissioning HV equipment and installations. The proposed 
enhancement of the classification introduced by the imitative would only require to distinguish 
electrical faults according to the type of equipment they refer to (e.g. Neutral Earth Switch, 
Cable Sealing Ends Links , Busbars, G.I.S Switchgear ,  HV Lightning Arrestor, HV 
Transformer Bushing, Oil Filled Circuit Breaker , Capacitor Bank etc..). This further distinction 
would enable also to classify possible troubleshooting adopted for recurring faults. 
 Figure 3: Existing near miss categories for event reported across the entire company in 2009 
 
 
 
The feedback mechanism  
As already pointed out the main purpose of reporting near misses is the possibility of using the 
resulting data to initiate improvements and possible interventions able to prevent more serious 
events and accidents. Further the feedback to the reporters on the follow up initiated thanks to 
their reporting is an important motivational factor. Therefore the safety advisor had to take care 
that after each report a communication about the status of the analysis and the possible initiated 
action would reach the front line staff in charge of reporting. 
 
Since the beginning of the initiative 29 near misses have been reported in the past 12 months 
and the follow up of 62% of them was already completed and communicated to the report 
initiators. 
 
Preliminary Results   
The initiative in the first 12 months was already able to increase by 14 times the amount of 
reports that were previously obtained within a year, further the level of technical details 
acquired and their relevance is much more meaningful and in depth in comparison to what 
collected previously. 
Table 1: Initial outline of results of the Initiative 
Near Miss Reports  Amount  Location 
Centrally collected Events in 2009 768 Site / Office  
Events collected at the division level of  
Engineering Solutions 2009 
60 100% of them are related to the 
Office 
Near Misses collected for AMS in 2009 2 100% of them are related to the 
Office 
Near Misses collected for AMS in 12 months after 
new definition was introduced (12 months approx.) 
29 90% of them are related to Site  
  
 
Conclusions 
 
Data collection programs such as these provide a real-time review of current safety issues in the 
operations departments. Real-time data review facilitates the identification of areas where 
modifications to working practices, equipment, training programs or standard operating 
procedures might be appropriate. Such modification might reduce costs as it improves the 
availability of equipment and prevent the occurrence of future safety events (incidents or 
accidents) as well.  This seems to be a very proactive way of managing safety with very positive 
implications for day to day operations efficiency as well. The key to success is arriving at the 
desired cultural climate as a result of the system changes introduced. This is why a careful 
understanding of people dynamics is not to be underestimated. In the present experience the role 
of a safety advisor close at hand on site with the capacity to follow up on issues raised on the 
field was highlighted as a very important factor towards the achievement of a better promotion 
of a reporting culture and a closer feedback to the front line staff. 
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